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Abstract— In the growing industry of mHealth, mobile medical 
apps are becoming a popular mechanism for healthcare 
delivery. Characteristically, these apps are designed to both 
process and transmit data that is sensitive medical data. Such 
data is required to be kept private and secure through 
regulations and legislation. The detections of increased app 
hacking by security companies and researchers are especially 
significant amidst today’s rapid growth in healthcare mobile 
apps. Consequently, security and integrity of the data 
associated with these apps is a growing concern for the app 
industry, particularly in the highly regulated medical domain. 
Until recently, data integrity and security in transmission has 
not been given serious consideration in the development of 
mobile medical apps. There are currently no procedures or 
standard practices for developers of mobile medical apps to 
assure data integrity and security in transmission. This paper 
is an overview of existing mobile medical apps data security 
issues and security practices.  We discuss current regulations, 
standards and best practices concerning data security in 
mobile medical apps. The paper introduces the concept of a 
process model and testing suite to assist mobile medical app 
developers to implement data security requirements to assure 
the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of data in 
transmission.  
Keywords-Mobile Medical Apps; data security; regulations; 
data security testing. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In mHealth, mobile apps are generally classified into 
mobile health/wellbeing apps (MHAs) and mobile medical 
apps (MMAs). A MMA is an app that qualifies as a medical 
device and is therefore required to follow the applicable 
medical device regulatory requirements. Medical 
professionals and the general public use mobile apps to 
perform many tasks, such as: health and fitness tracking, 
sharing medical videos, photos and x-rays; blogs to post 
medical cases and images; share personal health information; 
and keep track of alerts on specific medical conditions and 
interests [1]. MMAs are evolving quickly with the 
processing capabilities of mobile devices. The use of mobile 
apps enables dynamic access to personal identifiable 
information and the collection of greater amounts of 
sensitive data relating to personal health information (PHI). 
The use of mobile apps implicates changes in the way health 
data will be managed, as the data moves away from central 
systems located in the services of healthcare providers, to 
apps on mobile devices [2]. Increasing reliance on mobile 
apps raises questions about compromised patient privacy [3] 
and security of the data accompanying the apps [2]. The 
PwC’s Health Research Institute’s survey claims 78% of 
surveyed consumers were worried about medical data 
security, while 68% were concerned about the security of 
their data in mobile apps [4].  
The impact of data breaches in the medical industry is 
far-reaching in terms of costs, losses in reputation [5] and 
potential risk to patient safety. Reasons for obtaining access 
to PHI can be for monetary aim, harmful and personal 
intention [6]. An example of the importance of cybersecurity 
can be seen with the health insurer Anthem in the US. A 
reported breach involved hackers obtaining personal 
identifiable information and PHI for about 80 million of its 
customers and employees [7]. The information stolen falls 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA), which is the federal law governing the 
security of medical data and could result in fines up to 
$1.5million. A data breach that maliciously makes changes 
to a medical diagnosis or prescribed medication has serious 
consequences in terms of physical harm and patient safety. 
With PHI breaches, either through physician diagnosis or a 
treatment plan, the possibility of personal harm or loss is 
pronounced. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates 
medical devices in the U.S and are alert to the cybersecurity 
of medical devices. In July 2015, the FDA issued a 
cybersecurity alert to users of a Hospira Symbiq Infusion 
System pump, where it strongly recommended discontinued 
use, as it could be hacked and dosage changed [8]. In 
September 2015, the FBI issued a cybersecurity alert, 
outlining how Internet of Things (IoT) devices may be a 
target for cybercrimes and may put users at risk [9]. If a 
cyber-thief changes patient medical information or a 
physician diagnosis, serious medical harm or even death can 
result. An article that references the DarkNet, describes how 
it is now possible to purchase a medical identity that mirrors 
individual ailments, size, age and gender, to seek "free" 
medical services that would not be suspicious to a clinician. 
It states this type of crime is estimated to cost the healthcare 
industry in the US between $35 billion and $80 billion each 
year [10].   
It is largely assumed MMAs are not typically deployed in 
“hacker rich” mobile environments [11]. However, Arxan 
research shows that many sensitive medical and healthcare 
apps have been hacked with 22% of these being FDA 
approved apps  [11]. MMA developers do not have extensive 
experience with the types of threats other consumer app 
industries (e.g., banking) are familiar with. Consequently, 
security and privacy has not been given serious consideration 
until recently, while the importance of security is getting 
recognized little is yet being done [12]. Development of 
MMAs is picking up momentum as many companies are 
lured into the domain by the explosion of the market and the 
potential financial gains. However, issues arise such as: 
many of these developers are not coming from the highly 
regulated medical device domain and are not aware of the 
data protection and privacy requirements of PHI. Developers 
coming from the medical device domain are discovering the 
technical complications of entering the mobile domain. The 
European Commission’s ‘Green Paper on mHealth’, findings 
are that this market is dominated by individuals or small 
companies, with 30% being individuals and 34.3% are small 
companies (defined as having 2-9 employees) [13]. This 
would advocate a lack of experience, knowledge and 
financial means to address the issues outlined above. The 
research aims to assist developers address privacy and 
security of data for MMAs, drawing from the standards and 
best practice perspectives. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II covers 
background on MMAs and data transmission. This section 
also discusses MMA security matters. Section III, outlines 
the privacy and security laws for health data. In Section IV, 
we introduce our research of a process model to assure the 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of data in 
transmission for developers of MMAs. Finally, we conclude 
the paper and present the future work in Section V. 
II. BACKGOUND 
A. MMAs and Data Transmission 
In July 2011, the FDA issued draft guidance for MMAs 
and defined a “mobile medical app” as a software application 
run on a mobile platform (mobile phones, tablets, notebooks 
and other mobile devices) that is either used as an accessory 
to a regulated medical device or transforms a mobile 
platform into a regulated medical device and can be used in 
the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of disease [14].  
Mobile devices now provide many of the capabilities of 
traditional PCs with the additional benefit of a large selection 
of connectivity options [15]. Mobile devices typically 
connect to wireless sensor networks, which are being used in 
a wide range of medical and healthcare apps [16]. Wireless 
Body Area Networks (WBAN) emerged in order to address 
the growing field of sensor technologies. A WBAN is a 
purpose sensor network that operates independently to 
connect to various medical sensors and appliances, located 
inside and outside of a human body [17]. The information is 
transmitted via independent nodes that collect sensitive (life-
critical) information [18]. A Task Group IEEE 802.15.61, 
was established for the standardization of WBAN. The 
current IEEE 802.15.6 standard purpose was to define new 
Physical (PHY) and Medium Access Control (MAC) layers 
for WBAN and defines three PHY layers; Narrowband (NB), 
Ultra wideband (UWB), and Human Body Communications 
(HBC) layers. The selection of each PHY depends on the 
application requirements.  
Currently, technologies used for data transmission 
include Bluetooth/ Bluetooth Low Energy, ZigBee, UWB, 
Wireless Medical Telemetry Service (WMTS), 
communication networks such as WiFi (WLAN) and mobile 
data networks 3G & 4G. Data is transmitted to and from the 
MMA or to sensors on a personal health device or a medical 
device. Other transmission of data may occur between the 
MMA and for example: remote Health/Service Centers; 
Medical Professionals; or Health Record Networks. In some 
cases, the information sent to the MMA is processed on the 
app and retransmitted to the specified device or center. 
Through MMAs the collection of significant medical, 
physiological, lifestyle and daily activity data [13] is greatly 
amplified and transmitted via varied and numerous networks. 
B. Mobile Medical Application Security 
Security and privacy related to patient data are two 
essential components for MMAs. The fundamental concepts 
when considering data security are confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. Confidentiality is protection of the 
information from disclosure to unauthorized parties. Integrity 
refers to protecting information from being modified by 
unauthorized parties. Availability is ensuring that authorized 
parties are able to access the information when needed. 
When considering data security risks for MMAs it is 
necessary to specify what types of security threats they 
should be protected against. Deployment of MMAs involves 
security threats from multiple threat sources which include: 
attacks; the user; other mobile apps; network carriers; 
operating systems and mobile platforms. These security risks 
are further extended when consideration is given to the 
unauthorized access to the functionality of supporting 
devices and unauthorized access to the data stored on 
supporting devices [19]. The 2015 Ponemon report on 
mobile app security, emphasized that not enough is spent on 
mobile app security [20]. 
1) Attacks: Attacks are the techniques that attackers use 
to exploit the vulnerabilities in applications. There are 
numerous tools available for hacking into MMAs and 
wireless networks. Hackers target mobile apps to gain entry 
into servers or databases in the form of malware attacks. A 
recent list of these tools can be found in the Appendix of the 
Araxan Report [11]. This report examined 20 sensitive 
medical and healthcare apps and discovered 90% of 
Android apps and no iOS apps have been subject to hacking 
[11]. When data travels across a network, they are 
susceptible to being read, altered, or “hijacked”. Potential 
for breaches of confidentiality of data occurs during 
collection and transmission of data. Data in transmission to 
and from the MMAs must be protected from hacking. Some 
of the most common issues (but not inclusive) are 
Easvesdropping, Malware, Node Compromise, Packet 
Injection, Secure Localization, Secure Management, 
Sniffing Attacks, Denial of Service (DoS), SQL injection 
attacks, Code Injection and Man-in-the Middle attacks. The 
consideration of WBANs for MMAs must satisfy rigorous 
security and privacy requirements [18]. Wireless channels 
are open to everyone. Monitoring and participation in the 
communication in a wireless channel can be done with a 
radio interface configured at the same frequency band [21]. 
This may cause severe damage to the patient since the 
cybercriminal can use the attained data [18] for many of the 
illegal purposes mentioned above. The ISO/IEEE 11073 
standard deals only with mutual communication protocols 
and frameworks exchanged between and has never 
considered security elements until recently, irrespective of all 
sorts of security breaches [22]. Security issues must be 
resolved while designing medical and healthcare apps for 
sensor networks to avoid data security issues [16].  
2) Users: Many of the mobile devices will be personal 
and bypass the majority of inbound filters normally 
associated with corporate devices which leaves them 
vulnerable to malware. It is important that the user has good 
knowledge of the security safeguards, what measures to 
follow and what precautions to take [23]. A key challenge 
with MMA data is the lack of security software installed on 
mobile devices [24]. Many mobile device users do not avail 
of or are unacquainted with basic technical security 
measures, such as firewalls, antivirus and security software 
measures. Mobile device operating systems are very 
complex and therefore demand additional security controls 
for the prevention and detection of attacks against them 
[25]. The accessibility of social media and email make it 
easy to post or share information in violation of HIPAA 
regulations.  An example being, a New York nurse was fired 
because she posted a photo to Instagram of a trauma room 
after treating a patient [26]. Mixed with the availability to 
mobile phone cameras and social media apps, the risk of 
employees divulging PHI and violating HIPAA 
requirements has increased [27]. One of the greatest threats 
to MMA data security lies with the fact that most are on 
mobile devices which are portable, making them much more 
likely to be lost or stolen [28]. Potentially any data on the 
device is accessible to the thief, including access to any data 
and hospital networks. Due to the regulatory protection of 
PHI, it is important that even when the app is on a stolen 
device the security of the data remains protected and is 
regularly backed-up [25]. Measures should be available to 
remotely lock the MMA, disable service, completely wipe 
out the data [25] and restrict access to supporting devices. 
Not all users password-protect their devices. Even when 
passwords are used because of the lack of physical 
keyboards with mobile devices, users tends not use complex 
passwords to secure their information. The use of more than 
one type of authentication technique suggested by Alqahtani, 
would afford better data security for MMAs [25]. The 
difficulty is requesting lengthened authentication 
requirements from a busy medical professional. Inputting 
numerous passwords, or waiting for an authentication code 
in a pressurized situation is not desirable.  
3) Other mobile apps: Unfortunately, many users 
download mobile apps often without considering the 
security implications. Unintentionally, a user can download 
malware in the form of another application, an update or by 
downloading from an unauthorised source. The difficulty in 
detecting the attack was due to the fact that there currently is 
no mobile device management application programming 
interface (API) to obtain the certificate information for each 
app [29]. An attacker can use Masque Attacks to bypass the 
normal app sandbox and get root privileges by attacking 
known iOS vulnerabilities [29]. Cloned apps are a concern, 
over 50% of cloned apps are malicious and therefore pose 
serious risks. A recently discovered iOS banking app 
malware, Masque Attacks, replace an authentic app with 
malware that has an identical UI. The Masque Attacks 
access the original app's local data, which wasn't removed 
when the original app was replaced and steal the sensitive 
data [29]. The mobile device management interface did not 
distinguish the malware from the original as it had used the 
same bundle identifier.            
4) Operating systems & devlopment: Consideration with 
handling data on mobile devices includes unintended data 
leakage. It is essential that the MMA is not susceptible to 
analytic providers that will sell the data to marketing 
companies. The app stores are attempting to address this, 
e.g., Apple is banning app developers from selling 
HealthKit data or storing it on iCloud. Google insists that 
the user is in control of health data as apps cannot be 
accessed without the user providing permission. Developers 
could include analytics that report how often a section of the 
MMA was viewed, similar to the analytics credit card 
provider’s use to flag unwanted access to data. It is equally 
important to consider the intentional or unintentional 
sharing of personal information. Leakage of personal data 
from the device to the MMA and the leakage of MMA data 
onto personal devices are key considerations. The bypass of 
outbound filters elevate the risk of non-compliance with 
data privacy laws and requirements, e.g., the use of personal 
Dropbox. 
  A basic requirement such as encryption is not used in 
many apps. Data is encrypted so that it is not disclosed whilst 
in transit. Data encryption service provides confidentiality 
against attacks. The requirement of encryption is stressed, 
not only for the data, but for the code in development to 
assure data security [16][25]. Data encryption of passwords 
and usernames if they are to be storage on the MMA is 
essential, many apps store this information in unencrypted 
text. This means that anyone with access to the mobile 
device the MMA resides on can see passwords and 
usernames by connecting the device to a PC. If the MMA is 
hacked, the information encrypted will be useless to the 
cybercriminals. Many apps send data over an HTTPS 
connection without checking for revoked certificates [30]. 
MMA developers should ensure that back-end APIs within 
mobile platforms are strengthened against attacks using state 
of the art encryption. As discussed above a MMA could 
expose healthcare systems that had not previously been 
accessible from outside their own networks. In MMA data 
security consideration developers should always use modern 
encryption algorithms that are accepted as strong by the 
security community. 
Hackers are aware that just because a patch was released 
does not means it was applied, which, in turn make the app 
vulnerable for attacks [31]. Some recommend the installation 
of “Prevention and Detection” software for defending and 
protecting against malware as essential [25]. Consequently, 
software that tracks detection and anticipates attacks would 
require consideration in MMA development. 
It is essential that developers research the mobile 
platforms they are developing for. Each mobile OS offers 
different security-related features, uses different APIs and 
handles data permissions its own way.  Developers should 
adapt the code accordingly for each platform the MMA will 
be run on. There are no standards that straddle development 
or security testing across the different platforms. Developers 
design security for each individual OS. 
III. PRIVACY AND SECURITY LAWS FOR HEALTH DATA 
In the rush to market the aspects of privacy and security  
are not properly considered [32]. Increasingly, MMA 
developers must deal with a range of international 
regulations if they want to perform business in more than 
one country. The absence of privacy laws in some countries, 
in addition to inconsistency or even conflicting laws, means 
PHI is often misused and treated superficially.  Some MMA 
providers find they are in breach of regulation only when 
they are warned or fined, blindsided by regulatory issues, 
due to the complexity [33]. Privacy and security policy 
issues relating to data with MMAs are now of  primary 
importance  since the surge in the value of PHI on the black-
market partly due to the lack of security controls within 
healthcare and the increase in the security of credit card data 
[34]. A global landscape analysis of current privacy 
legislation and regulation was undertaken by Thomas 
Reuters Foundation and mHealth Alliance on the privacy and 
security policies to protect health data [33]. The report states, 
that most jurisdictions agree, data security is essential and 
suggests the world of privacy law is divided into three major 
groups: Omnibus data protection regulation in the style of 
the European laws that regulate all personal information 
equally; U.S.-style sectorial privacy laws that address 
specific privacy issues arising in certain industries and 
business sectors, so that only certain types of personal 
information are regulated; The constitutional approach, 
whereby certain types of personal information are considered 
private and compelled from a basic human rights perspective 
but no specific privacy regulation is in place otherwise [33]. 
A. European Union 
If you have MMAs within the EU, the EU Data 
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) [35] is the key 
piece of regulation that will affect how you manage and store 
data. This is the one law in the EU regarding security and 
privacy in health data. This Directive is implemented in laws 
of Member States and requires establishment of supervisory 
authorities to monitor its application.  However, at the 
beginning of 2012, the EU approved the draft of the 
European Data Protection Regulation [36]. This means the 
law will apply generally over all states in the EU, so it will 
not require individual Member States implementation. With 
this progression in regulation all Member States will be at 
the same stage of security and data protection [32]. Directive 
2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 July 2002 [37], known as the ePrivacy Directive, is 
concerned with the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the digital age. It is now law in all 
EU countries and covers all non-essential cookies, and 
tracking devices. This Directive principally concerns the 
processing of personal data relating to the delivery of 
communications services. It provides rules on how providers 
of electronic communication services, should manage their 
subscribers' data. It also guarantees rights for subscribers 
when they use these services. The key parts that MMA 
developers are concerned with in the directive are: 
processing security; confidentiality of communication; 
processing traffic and location data; cookies and controls. 
B. United States 
According to the Thomas Reuters Foundation and 
mHealth Alliance report, the US is one of the legislative 
leaders in this area [33]. The main law that applies to health 
data issues is HIPAA as stated previously. HIPAA was 
updated in the HIPAA Omnibus Rule required by The Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
Act of 2010, (HITECH Act). The HITECH Act established 
new information security breach notification requirements 
that apply to businesses that handle personal health 
information and other health data [38]. The FDA released 
guidance “Content of Premarket Submissions for 
Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices” and this 
provides a list of recognized consensus standards dealing 
with Information Technology and medical device security 
[39]. The fact that MMAs may transmit information 
wirelessly places them in the domain of Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) regulation to ensure 
consumer and public safety [40]. Recognizing the need for 
regulatory clarity, the FCC, FDA, Office of the National 
Coordinator (ONC) and the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) came together in a grouping called 
the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation 
Act (FDASIA) Working Group. The group released a report 
that contains a proposed strategy and recommendations on 
an appropriate, risk-based regulatory framework pertaining 
to health information technology including MMAs [41]. 
IV. PROPROSED CURRENT RESEARCH 
A. Research Background 
As the MMA domain grows and becomes a standard 
established mechanism for health delivery, data security and 
privacy of health data will be essential. MMAs are being 
developed persistently without proper security application, 
principally due to the lack of understanding of current 
standards, regulation requirements and best practice 
pertaining to data security in healthcare. There are currently 
no process models or testing suites for developers to assure 
data security in transmission for MMAs.  
The proposed research is developed using the only 
Medical Device (MD) security standard, IEC/TR 80001-2-
2:2012. This standard presents 19 high-level security-related 
capabilities in understanding the type of security controls to 
be considered and the risks that lead to the controls [42]. 
IEC/DTR 80001-2-8 (currently at a committee draft stage) is 
a catalogue of security controls developed relating to the 
security capabilities defined in IEC/TR 80001-2-2. The 
report presents mapping of security controls for developing 
security cases to establish confidence in each of the security 
capabilities [43]. Accordingly, the security controls support 
the maintenance of confidentiality and protection from 
malicious intrusion. The report provides guidance to 
healthcare organizations and MD manufacturers for the 
selection of security controls to protect the CIA and 
accountability of data and systems during development, 
operation and disposal [43]. 
This research leverages on the established security 
controls in IEC/WD TR 80001-2-8 relating to the two 
transmission security capabilities from IEC/TR 80001-2-2. 
We will also apply additional security controls pertinent to 
MMAs, accomplished with comparative expert validation, 
by means of analysis of applicable standards and best 
practices. Further, we will research to adopt testing methods 
and applicable tests to form a testing suite, in collaboration 
with a data security expert to assure that the required security 
controls for data CIA in data transmission are in place. 
B. Approach 
The research will be completed in three parts.  The 
research method will consist of Literature Review (LR) and 
Action Design Research (ADR) for each part.  
1) Approach part one: The two transmission security 
capabilities selected from IEC/WD 80001-2-2 will provide 
the starting point. The catalogue of security controls in 
IEC/WD 80001-2-8 for the two capabilities will provide the 
basis for the security controls. The LR for this part will 
establish the additional standards and best practices 
pertaining to mobile data transmission and security of data. 
To develop the process to establish the security controls 
applicable to MMAs. Some of the standards and best 
practices currently being research include  (but not 
inclusive) are: ISO/IEC 11073; NIST SP 800-53, OWASP 
mobile security; NIST FIPS 140-2; ISO 27799. The LR will 
additionally review other domains that have experience in 
data security in transmisssion, e.g., financial, to establish 
practices. The ADR fragment will develop and validate the 
process with comparitive expert review. 
2) Approach part two: A LR will establish the current 
cyber attacks on mobile apps, MDs and MMAs and 
establish a database. The LR will additionally research 
testing methods associated with the attacks and applicable 
tests. This part will be completed in collaboration with 
identified data security experts and a testing 
organisationation. To assure that the required security 
controls for data CIA in data transmission are in place. The 
Testing Suite will be complied through ADR via the data 
experts, testing organisation and MMA developers. 
3) Approach part three; The completion of the research 
will be through ADR with two identified MMA 
development companies. The development of the Process 
Model and the Testing suite will be validated through ADR 
with industrial partners. Completion of the research aim is 
the demonstration of confidence of data security during 
transmission MMAs. Therefore demonstrating 
confidence/trust in the data transmission and storage. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper examined existing data security issues and 
practices in relation to MMAs. A summary of regulations 
relating to data privacy and security MMA providers are 
mandated by law to adhere to, were outlined. Compliance 
and improved understanding of data security regulations and 
best practices will assist developers to meet the security 
requirements for data in transmission. The security gaps in 
MMAs are exploited due to lack of knowledge, 
understanding or amalgamated regulation for data security 
with MMAs.   
The mobile app industry claim innovation is stifled, due 
to the lack of clarity in regulations and security concerns. 
Developers will need to find the optimal balance between 
data security and privacy as MMAs expand and PHI enters 
into new aspects. The lack of consistent data security to 
assure privacy, to allow interoperability, and to maximize the 
full capabilities [44] of presents a significant barrier to the 
industry. The primary focus of our future research in this 
domain will be in the development and implementation of 
both the process model and testing suite. Validation of the 
research will be completed in collaboration with two MMA 
development companies. The MMAs being developed will 
have different transmission requirements and capabilities to 
assure diversity. 
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